25 November 2004

Molar and Molecular Politics in Practice

Aias Grimmelschausen's recent comments are very helpful in illustrating precisely why ethics, or the logic used to determine "right/wrong," is inexorably infested with values of molar politics. He writes:

Case #1: Should I fight for the resistance against Marco in the Spanish Civil War.
Case #2: Should I, as a Arab-American, give up some of my civil rights to help protect my fellow Americans and other citizens of the world.
Analysis: In case #1 the Molecular approach appears to give us what we would call "the right answer", but in case #2 the molar approach provides "the right answer". Please comment.

I would actually modify his conclusion as follows: In case #1 the molar approach grants us the "right" answer from the perspective of a molar agent ("I"). In case #2 the molecular approach produces the "right" answer from the perspective of a system that values molar agents.

Both of these examples presuppose the valuing of molar politics. Thus begins my critique of modern ethics. The Arab-American's acquiescing to the community of "America" at large does not entail the opening of possibilities for a true community, because the "community" has already developed its own Gestalt, which closes possibilities.

Accounting for the way molar units are formed from the heterogeneous is the first step in the opening up of possibilities for the future.

2 comments:

  1. I am guessing that the concept "doing the work" here is: what is the right answer from the perspective of a system that values molar agents. (Unless you have in mind a case where 'the perspective of the molar agent' would outweigh 'the perspective of the system that values molar agents' if they were ever to come into conflict.)

    This sounds very much similar to a utilitarian style ethics, except that we are measuring ethics in terms of freedom rather than by happiness. The "right" answer to an ethical case is that which increases freedom in the system as a whole. (That seems to me very similar to your description of the molar perspective.)

    The classic arguments against utilitarianism would in turn apply here. How does one measure freedom? What about cases where the individual is wrong in his assessment of what will bring about the greatest amount of freedom? ... is his/her attempt to be judged only by outcome, or does intent matter. And how do opportunity costs apply? ... that is, am I required to always go after the greatest system-wide freedom maximization, will any plus on that side make me a "good" person.

    Going back to case#1 where our young man fought against Marco. He fought in vain, of course, so he would have been better off staying home and working to develop grant money for minority students. He could just as easily have done that. So, does it follow, that he could have been a better person from the molar agent perspective?

    Aias Grimmelshausen

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  2. From the molecular standpoint, this does resemble utilitarian ethics, except the system problematizes the underlying values of utilitarianism. And so, yes, the questions you pose that challenge utilitarianism are necessary ones. And I would answer some of them by saying: there is a problem in measuring good and bad, opportunity costs, etc. because we are unable to determine what is really lifegiving or what really opens up possibilities from a molar (individualist) perspective with mutliple accompanying ideologies that make up each individual subject. Therefore, judging whether the man fighting Marco is "good" or "bad" is equally problematic. I think, more then setting up a system of ethics, I'm problematizing ethics that originate from an individualist/molar perspective. I'm not yet sure if my ethics will ever be useful in helping us judge actions, but I'm finding them helpful in understanding the way things work and the way values underlie everything.

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